Crime/Fidelity Insurance

An employee of an insurance company created fictitious vendors and invoices for the services rendered and settlement required. Her co-conspirator spouse, in the accounts department, arranged payment

The owners of a popular entertainment venue discovered that their facilities manager submitted false expense claims. While the venue was undergoing renovation, the manager submitted many personal purchases as corporate expenses. The insured’s investigation discovered that the employee had expensed construction materials used to build his house and gifts purchased for his significant other

A food and beverage company received an email from an individual in a foreign country who was impersonating the company’s regular product broker. The imposter stated that they were auditing one of the insured’s vendors. As part of the audit, the imposter requested that payment for recent invoices be made to new accounts. As this request was outside of standard operating practices, the insured requested confirmation on a company letterhead signed by the brokerage president. Upon receipt of the documentation, payment was transferred. Days later, when the real product broker contacted the insured, the insured recognized the scam. Through investigation, it was determined that the email address used to commit the fraud was one letter different than the legitimate product broker’s address.

A controller of an insured left a deposit bag in the trunk of their car. After the deposit bag was stolen from the unlocked trunk, the controller attempted to cover up the loss of funds with creative accounting entries. Later, the insured discovered the controller’s fraudulent accounting entries as well as the loss of the funds and secured a sworn proof of loss.

A company’s bank allegedly sent it a letter advising of a new security program. The company then received an email that appeared to be from their bank. The company’s employee opened the email, which allowed a Trojan horse computer virus to get in. It was able to read key strokes from the insured’s computer, thereby enabling the perpetrator to obtain banking and password information and initiate a fraudulent electronic wire transfer from the insured’s account

A vice president of finance embezzled over a 10-year period. The scheme included creating false invoices from a vendor, then substituting the cheque that was issued payable to the vendor with a check payable to himself in the same amount. When the cancelled checks were returned each month, he replaced the cancelled cheque payable to him with the un-cashed cheque payable to the vendor for the false invoice

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